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Insurance Law-AN

INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND ITS INSURED AND AN

INSURER'S LIABILITY FOR WRONGFULLY DECLINING TO DEFEND ITS IN-

SURED-Lanoue v. Fireman's Fund Amer'can Insurance Cos., 278 N.W.2d 49
(Minn. 1979).
In recent years, courts have broadened an insurer's duty to defend its
insured. 1 The once unchallenged 2 rule that only those allegations contained in an injured party's complaint will determine the insurer's duty
to defend 3 has been increasingly disregarded in favor of the rule that the
facts surrounding a cause of action may also determine the insurer's duty
to defend.4 Although an insurer's duty to defend arises from the insurance contract, 5 courts have frequently overlooked the contractual terms
giving the insured the right to a defense.6 Furthermore, courts often
have ignored the distinction between an insurer's duty to defend and its
1. See R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW §§ 6.3(a), 7.6(a) (1971). See
generalo Cahoon, Company's Duty to Defend-Recent Developments, 1961 INS. L.J. 151; Note,
Use of the DeclaratoyJudgmentto Determine a Liabihy Insurer'sDuty to Defend--Conftzct of Interests, 41 IND. L.J. 87 (1965); Note, Detemination ofan Insurer'sDuty to Defend, 34 TEMP. L.Q.
152 (1961); Comment, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a Liabihty Insurance Policy, 114 U.
PA. L. REV. 734 (1966).
2. It was not until 1937 that the apparently uniform acceptance of the general rule
was broken. See Cahoon, supra note I, at 151 & n.2.
3. E.g., Truchinski v. Cashman, 257 N.W.2d 286, 287 (Minn. 1977); Republic Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Buehl, 295 Minn. 327, 332-33, 204 N.W.2d 426, 429 (1973). Seegenera4'y
7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE §§ 4682-4683 (Berdal rev. 1979); 14 G.
COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 51:40, :44 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1965 &
Supp. 1978).
4. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Civil Serv. Employees Ins. Co., 33
Cal. App. 3d 26, 34, 108 Cal. Rptr. 737, 742-43 (1973); Shepard Marine Constr. Co. v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 73 Mich. App. 62, 65, 250 N.W.2d 541, 542 (1976); Crum v. Anchor
Cas. Co., 264 Minn. 378, 392, 119 N.W.2d 703, 712 (1963); 14 G. COUCH, supra note 3,
§ 51:47.
5. An insurer's duty to defend its insured against suits seeking damages within policy
coverage is a standard feature of liability insurance policies. See, e.g., Republic Vanguard
Ins. Co. v. Buehl, 295 Minn. 327, 332, 204 N.W.2d 426, 429 (1973) (insurer's duty to
defend to be determined by allegations of complaint against insured and indemnity coverage afforded by policy); Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 276
Minn. 362, 367, 150 N.W.2d 233, 236 (1967) (insurer's duty to defend is independent
obligation existing exclusively between the insurer and the insured); 7C J. APPLEMAN,
supra note 3, § 4682 (insurer has duty to defend any action when, if liability is established,
the insurer would be liable); 14 G. COUCH, supra note 3, § 51:32 (insurer's duty to defend
is correlative requirement to insurer's exclusive control over litigation against insured).
6. In Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Bartlett, 307 Minn. 72, 240 N.W.2d 310 (1976), overruled in part on other grounds, Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn.
1979), the provision that an insurer has a " 'duty to defend any suit against the insured
seeking damages on account of. . . bodily injury or property damage [covered by this
policy], even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent,' " was
construed to cover suits merely alleging a cause of action covered by the policy. See 307
Minn. at 75, 240 N.W.2d at 312. Such a construction disregards the apparent contractual
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duty to pay claims covered by the policy. 7 Related to the question of
whether an insurer is obligated to defend is the question of which party,
the insured or the insurer, has the burden of proving that the loss sustained falls within or without policy coverage. 8
In

Lanoue v. Fireman's Fund American Insurance Cos.,9 the Minnesota

Supreme Court clarified its position on these issues. The court in Lanoue
held that when the alleged cause of action is excluded from policy coverage but the insurer is aware of facts outside the complaint that may negate the exclusion, such facts must be considered in determining the
insurer's duty to defend. to The court also reaffirmed its position that an
insurer seeking to avoid the obligation to defend its insured carries the
burden of demonstrating that the cause of action falls clearly outside the
scope of the policy coverage.I' Finally, the Lanoue court held that insurers wrongfully refusing to defend actions against insureds must bear the
insured's costs as well as the attorney's fees incurred by the insured in a
declaratory judgment action.12 Lanoue reinforces the Minnesota court's
intent that the insurer defend only those suits seeking recovery for injuries covered by the
policy, regardless of the allegations in the injured party's complaint.
Likewise, in Weis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 242 Minn. 141, 64 N.W.2d 366
(1954), the provision that the insurer agrees to "defend any suit against the insured alleging . . . injury [covered by this policy] and seeking damages on account thereof, even if
such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent," was construed to relieve an insurer of its obligation to defend a suit alleging a cause of action within coverage when the insurer was
aware that facts outside the complaint excluded the cause of action from coverage. See id.
at 145, 64 N.W.2d at 368. Again, such construction disregards the insurer's apparent duty
to defend any suit alleging a cause of action within policy coverage.
7. The phenomenon of courts ignoring the distinction is manifest in numerous decisions invoking the rules in complete disregard of the policy provisions establishing the
insurer's duty to defend. See, e.g., Garden Sanctuary, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. America,
292 So. 2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (insurer must defend against those portions of the
complaint outside policy coverage but may decline to pay that portion of judgment
outside policy coverage); Shepard Marine Constr. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 73 Mich.
App. 62, 250 N.W.2d 541 (1976) (insurer required to look beyond third party's complaint
to determine whether coverage was possible despite policy's exclusions); Ohio Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Flanagin, 44 N.J. 504, 210 A.2d 221 (1965) (insurer required to defend despite
several exclusions in policy).
8. Cf Boedigheimer v. Taylor, 287 Minn. 323, 329, 178 N.W.2d 610, 614 (1970)
(burden of proof rests on party claiming coverage, but once prima facie case for coverage
is established, insurer has burden of proving applicability of any exclusions).
9. 278 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 1979).
10. Id. at 53; see Crum v. Anchor Cas. Co., 264 Minn. 378, 392, 119 N.W.2d 703, 712
(1963).
11. 278 N.W.2d at 53; see Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn.
1979); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Bartlett, 307 Minn. 72, 76, 240 N.W.2d 310, 312 (1976),
overruled 'n
part on other grounds, Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn.
1979).
12. 278 N.W.2d at 55; see Morrison v. Swenson, 274 Minn. 127, 138, 142 N.W.2d 640,
647 (1966).
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now discernible position 13 that it will carefully scrutinize insurance policy provisions that are contrary to an insured's reasonable expectations in
order to effect a fair, if extra-contractual, construction of the insurance
policy. 14
The plaintiff in Lanoue was the owner and operator of a superette. A
personal injury suit alleging a dram shop cause of action was brought
against plaintiff individually and against his business.15 Plaintiff tendered defense of the suit to both his business liability insurer and his
homeowner's insurer.1 6 Both insurers refused to assume the defense, asserting that they were not obligated to defend because the injured party's
complaint alleged a cause of action excluded from the coverage of their
respective policies. 17 Plaintiff had informed each insurer of the facts surrounding the injury. These facts gave rise to a cause of action that ar13. Although the Minnesota court has regularly observed the general rule that the
allegations in the complaint alone determine the insurer's duty to defend, see notes 34-35
zn/fa and accompanying text, the court has demonstrated that it will ignore the general
rule when the particular case before it requires that extraneous facts be considered. See
note 38 in/a and accompanying text.
14. See notes 29-33, 36-38 infa and accompanying text.
15. 278 N.W.2d at 51. The superette did not sell liquor but it did sell 3.2 beer. At
about 11:00 p.m. on December 20, 1974, while the superette was still open for business,
Daniel O'Brien, an off-duty minor employee at the superette, entered the store. O'Brien
removed four six packs of 3.2 beer from the cooler and placed them outside the back door
of the superette. He then broke into Lanoue's office and took a bottle of whiskey Lanoue
had received as a Christmas gift from a wholesale supplier. After placing the whiskey
outside the back door with the beer, O'Brien went back into the store and made several
purchases. He then left the store through the front entrance and went around to the back
where he recovered the beer and whiskey. Neither of the two employees then working in
the store was aware of O'Brien's activity. Later that night another minor, Jeffrey Anderson, was injured in a one-car accident after having consumed some of the stolen whiskey.
Nine months after the accident, Jeffrey Anderson's parents brought suit against Lanoue
and his store alleging a dram shop cause of action. See id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Anderson's suit alleged that Lanoue, through his agents, servants, or employees, had furnished intoxicating beverages to Jeffrey Anderson. Id. Lanoue's business insurer, State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters, had expressly excluded indemnity for
"bodily injury or property damage for which the insurer or his indemnitee may be held
liable. . . as a personal organization engaged in the business of manufacturing, distributing, selling or serving alcoholic beverages." Respondent State Automobile and Casualty
Underwriters' Brief at 4. Based upon the dram shop allegations in the complaint, the
insurance company declined to defend Lanoue. 278 N.W.2d at 51.
Lanoue's homeowners policy, carried by Fireman's Fund American Insurance Companies, excluded indemnity for " 'bodily injury or property damage arising out of business
pursuits of any insured except activities therein which are ordinarily incident to non-business pursuits [or for] bodily injury or property damage arising out of any premises, other
than an insured premises, owned, rented or controlled by any insured.'" Id. at 53. Fireman's Fund maintained that the accident arose from business pursuits because the whiskey was given to Lanoue by a business associate and that the other-premises exclusion
applied because the accident occurred away from the insured premises. Id. at 51.
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guably constituted an "occurrence" ' 8 within the insurance coverage.19
After the insurers had declined to defend the lawsuit, plaintiff retained
counsel to defend the dram shop action and to seek declaratory judgment
against the insurers.20 In the declaratory judgment action, the trial court
found that the insurance companies were not obligated to defend.21
Plaintiff appealed from this judgment.
The threshold question on appeal was whether the allegations in the
original complaint controlled the insurer's obligation to defend. 22 The
long-established rule, still followed by a majority of courts, holds that the
initial determination of an insurer's duty to defend depends solely on the
allegations in the complaint.23 The majority rule relieves an insurer of
its duty to defend when the alleged cause of action is excluded from policy coverage,2 4 even though facts outside the complaint may constitute
an occurrence within the coverage of the policy and even though the
allegations in the complaint may be wholly without basis. 2 5

Because

18. "Occurrence" is the comprehensive term used in liability insurance policies to
describe the unexpected event or happening that the policy insures against. In Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Bartlett, 307 Minn. 72, 240 N.W.2d 310 (1976), overruled in part on other
grounds, Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. 1979), the policy in
question defined an occurrence as " 'an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.' " 307 Minn. at 76, 240
N.W.2d at 312 (emphasis omitted).
19. Ambiguities as to the insurer's duty to defend are generally construed against the
insurer. Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn. 1979); Lanoue v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos., 278 N.W.2d at 53; Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Bartlett, 307
Minn. 72, 76, 240 N.W.2d 310, 312 (1976), overruled in part on other grounds, Prahm v. Rupp
Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. 1979); Crum v. Anchor Cas. Co., 264 Minn. 378,
390, 119 N.W.2d 703, 711 (1963); 14 G. COUCH, supra note 3, § 51:45.
20. 278 N.W.2d at 51. Prior to the declaratory judgment action, Anderson amended
the complaint to include a negligence cause of action. Both insurers agreed to defend the
negligence cause of action. Id. at 51-52.
21. Id. at 52.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750, 751 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand,
C.J.); Republic Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Buehl, 295 Minn. 327, 332, 204 N.W.2d 426, 429
(1973); Cahoon, supra note 1, at 153; Note, Determinaton ofan Insurer's Duty to Defend, supra
note 1, at 153; Comment, supra note 1, at 734-38.
24. See, e.g., Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 276 Minn.
362, 369-70, 150 N.W.2d 233, 238 (1967) ("[W]here there is no coverage by reason of an
exclusionary clause, there is no obligation of the insurer to defend."); Bobich v. Oja, 258
Minn. 287, 293, 104 N.W.2d 19, 24 (1960) ("[A]n insurer ... is not bound to defend a suit
on a claim outside the coverage of the policy, even though under the terms thereof it is
obligated to defend all suits brought against the insured, whether groundless, false, or
fraudulent.").
25. See, e.g., Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750, 752-53 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand,
C.J.) ("[Where] the injured party [recovers] on a claim, which, as he had alleged it, was
outside the policy; but which, as it turned out, the insurer was bound to pay . . . the
insurer would not have to defend .... ");14 G. COUCH, supra note 3, § 51:41.
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courts applying the general rule rely exclusively upon the allegations in
the complaint, the rule may lead to harsh results.26 The Minnesota
The Lanoue decision appears to be the result of the court's reluctance to subscribe to
this particular consequence of the general rule; namely, that an insurer has no obligation
to defend a suit alleging a cause of action excluded from coverage, even though facts
outside the complaint bring the cause of action within coverage. In Gray v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966), the California Supreme Court
expressed its repugnance for the majority rule. The California court stated that a
[d]efendant cannot construct a formal fortress of the third party's pleadings and
retreat behind its walls. The pleadings are malleable, changeable and amendable . ..
To restrict the defense obligation of the insurer to the precise language of
the pleading would . . . create an anomaly for the insured. Obviously, . . . the
complainant in the third party action drafts his complaint in the broadest terms;
he may very well stretch the action which lies in only nonintentional conduct to
the dramatic complaint that alleges intentional misconduct. In light of the likely
overstatement of the complaint and of the plasticity of modern pleading, we
should hardly designate the third party as the arbiter of the policy's coverage.
Id. at 276, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112; accord, Ritchie v. Anchor Cas. Co., 135
Cal. App. 2d 245, 251, 286 P.2d 1000, 1003-04 (1955).
26. Because the general rule requires an insurer to defend only those suits alleging a
cause of action within policy coverage, see, e.g., Truchinski v. Cashman, 257 N.W.2d 286,
287 (Minn. 1977) (" '[w]here the allegations of a complaint state a cause of action within
the terms of policy coverage, the insurance company must undertake to defend the insured' ") (quoting Republic Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Buehl, 295 Minn. 327, 332-33, 204
N.W.2d 426, 429 (1973)), regardless of the veracity of the allegations, see, e.g., Truchinski
v. Cashman, 257 N.W.2d at 287 ("[A]n insurer's obligation to defend does not depend
upon the merits of the claim asserted against its insured."); F.D. Chapman Constr. Co. v.
Glens Falls Ins. Co., 297 Minn. 406, 408, 211 N.W.2d 871, 872 (1973) ("[Insurer] was
required to defend all actions against the insured-however false or groundless-if the
asserted cause of action was within the policy coverage."), overruledinfpart on other grounds,
Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. 1979), an insured can be left
without defense provided by his insurer even though a duty to pay arguably exists. See
notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text. The gap the general rule allows between the
insurer's duty to defend and its duty to indemnify has prompted one commentator to
suggest a third duty within the general rule, somewhere between the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify:
[Ilt may be useful to distinguish between a duty to defend and a duty to prepare
for defense-that is, a duty to take reasonable steps in preparation for defense
against claims that may be asserted in the future ...
If a duty to prepare for defense is recognized, it might arise when no action
has been filed and no claim has been made. It might also arise when an action
has been filed (or a claim has been made) solely upon a basis that does not
invoke a present duty to defend. The fact that the nature of the allegations (or
claims) is not such as to invoke a duty to defend does not preclude the possibility
that the nature of the underlying fact situation may give notice of a sufficient
likelihood of later amendments, in which claims within coverage will be asserted,
that the ordinarily prudent person'would take immediate preparatory steps. It
should be noted, however, that if this duty to prepare for defense is recognized, it
does not arise because of the mere possibility that the injured party will later file
a complaint, or an amended complaint, alleging a claim within policy coverage.
That possibility could be said to exist in every case. The source of the duty is,
instead, a probability of such degree that an ordinarily prudent person would act
in advance to be prepared to meet it if it should arise.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1980

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 8
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

Supreme Court, like courts in other jurisdictions,27 has, on occasion,
found it difficult to disregard facts outside the injured party's complaint. 28 For these reasons, the Lanoue court departed from the general
rule, relying on Wets v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 29 and
R. KEETON, supra note 1, § 7.6(a), at 474; see Comment, Insurance-Insurer'sLiabili for
Wrongful Refusal to Defend or Settle, 36 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 304, 310 & n.30 (1968).
Recognition of this duty might have been useful in Lanoue, although the majority and
dissent undoubtedly would have differed on the likelihood of allegations within policy
coverage being asserted.
27. See Garden Sanctuary, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 292 So. 2d 75 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Murray, 97 111. App. 2d 61, 239 N.E.2d 498
(1968); Shepard Marine Constr. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 73 Mich. App. 62, 250 N.W.2d
541 (1976); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Rombough, 19 Mich. App. 606, 173 N.W.2d 221 (1969);
Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970); Cook v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.,
418 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). ut see Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Flanagin, 44 N.J. 504,
210 A.2d 221 (1965); Consolidated Underwriters v. Loyd W. Richardson Constr. Corp.,
444 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
28. See notes 29-38 infa and accompanying text. In Iowa Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 276 Minn. 362, 150 N.W.2d 233 (1967), the Minnesota Supreme
Court noted that problems are likely to arise when liberal rules of pleading are coupled
with a strict observance of the general rule. The court stated by way of dicta that:
an insurer may not safely assume that the limits of its duties to defend are fixed
by the allegations a third party chooses to put in his complaint. While that rule
would have appeal as an easy and convenient guide, it is not one to be relied
upon under present practices where variances of proof from pleadings are generally tolerated and where relaxed pleading requirements under the Rules of Civil
Procedure provide little assurance 'hat the complaint of an injured party will
reflect the full extent of his demands for relief.
Id. at 370, 150 N.W.2d at 238; see Crum v. Anchor Cas. Co., 264 Minn. 378, 389, 119
N.W.2d 703, 710 (1963). But cf. Note, Use of the DeclaratoryJudgmentto Determine a Liability
Insurer's Duty to Defend-Conkct of Interests, 41 IND. L.J. 87 (1965). In this Note, the author
espouses a strict distinction between an insurer's duty to indemnify and its duty to defend.
Although the insurer is not obligated to defend a claim outside the policy coverage, this does not necessarily mean that the insurer is relieved of all its obligations under the policy. If the insured [defends the suit and proves] the actual
facts, the injured party's complaint would have [to be amended] to conform to
the proofs; and any recovery then [would be] within the policy coverage.
Id. at 90; see 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, at § 4684. See generaly MINN. R. Civ. P. 15.
For a discussion of the flexibility of the modern rules of pleading, see 103 U. PA. L. REV.
445 (1954).
29. 242 Minn. 141, 64 N.W.2d 366 (1954). In Wes plaintiff-insured intentionally ran
his car into a car owned by a third party. The third party and his wife took action to
recover damages, alleging both negligent and intentional misconduct on the part of plaintiff. Upon receiving the third partys' complaints, plaintiff notified his attorney who in
turn notified defendant, plaintiff's automobile insurer. Defendant then sent its agent to
visit plaintiff and discuss the matter. Plaintiff admitted to the agent that the collision was
intentional and that there had been no accident. Defendant thereafter declined defense of
the suit on the ground that no accident had occurred and that the entire incident resulted
from plaintiff's deliberate actions. Id. at 142-43, 64 N.W.2d at 367.
Plaintiff successfully defended the suit brought by the third party. Plaintiff subsequently initiated an action to recover his defense costs from defendant, alleging wrongful
refusal of defense. Although the third party's allegation of negligence was within policy
coverage, the Minnesota Supreme Court looked past the allegations in the complaint to
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Crum v. Anchor Casualty Co.30 In Wets the court found an exception to the
insurer's duty to defend when it held that an insurer had no duty to
defend suits alleging a cause of action within policy coverage if facts
outside the complaint exclude the cause of action from coverage. 3 1 In
Crum the court expanded the insurer's duty to defend by holding that the
insurer must defend suits alleging a cause of action excluded from coverage when it has knowledge of facts outside the complaint which, if established, would bring the cause of action within coverage. 3 2
Despite the court's deviation from the general rule in We-, Crum, and
Lanoue, 33 the Minnesota court otherwise has held that only the allegaplaintiff's conduct, statements, and admissions and held that the defendant's policy did
not cover the deliberate and intentional wrongful acts of the plaintiff and that therefore
defendant was not obligated to defend suits arising from those acts. Id. at 145-46, 64
N.W.2d at 368-69.
30. 264 Minn. 378, 119 N.W.2d 703 (1963). In Crum plaintiff-insured owned an
apartment house that was insured by defendant's owners, landlords, and tenants liability
policy. A tenant in plaintiff's building, who performed odd jobs around the apartment
house for a reduction in rent, injured herself when she fell down a stairway while returning from a social visit with another tenant. The injured tenant sued plaintiff for negligently maintaining the premises. Plaintiff forwarded the tenant's complaint to defendant
which undertook defense for the suit. See id. at 380-81, 119 N.W.2d at 704-05.
Although the tenant had unequivocally stated in her deposition that her injuries were
sustained while on a personal errand and not while performing work for plaintiff, she later
amended her complaint and alleged that her injuries arose out of and in the course of her
employment. Defendant thereafter discontinued its defense of plaintiff stating that its
policy expressly did not apply to injury to any employee of plaintiff arising out of and in
the course of her employment. See id. at 381-83, 119 N.W.2d at 705-07.
Plaintiff's counsel continued defense of the suit and reached a settlement with the
tenant. Plaintiff then sought to recover his defense and settlement costs from defendant,
alleging wrongful refusal of defense. Seed at 384, 119 N.W.2d at 707. Appealing to facts
outside the tenant's amended complaint, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court and held that because the insured has no control over the allegations of the complaint, when an insurer
is advised by the insured what he claims the facts to be or the insurer by an
independent investigation ascertains that the facts are in conflict with the complaint and, if established, will present a potential liability on the part of the
insured covered by the insurance contract, the insurer is obligated to undertake
the defense.
Id. at 392, 119 N.W.2d at 712.
31. 242 Minn. 141, 144, 64 N.W.2d 366, 368 (1954).
32. 264 Minn. 378, 387-88, 119 N.W.2d 703, 709 (1963).
33. One week after its Lanoue decision, the court decided another case construing an
insurer's duty to defend. In Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. 1979),
the court held that when the cause of action against the insured does not fall clearly within
the policy's exclusionary clause, the insurer is required to defend. Id. at 390. The court
also overruled its prior position that an insurer may defend its insured while reserving the
right to contest coverage. Id. at 391. The former position of the court is best illustrated in
Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Bartlett, 307 Minn. 72, 76, 240 N.W.2d 310, 312 (1976), overruled
zipart on other grounds, Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. 1979),
and F.D. Chapman Constr. Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 297 Minn. 406, 408-09, 211
N.W.2d 871, 872 (1973), overruled h part on other grounds, Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277
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tions contained in an injured party's complaint may be considered when
determining the insurer's duty to defend. 34 This divergent treatment of
the insurer's duty to defend assumes continuity when viewed within the
doctrine of reasonable expectations. This doctrine holds that an insured's reasonable expectations of coverage or benefits will be honored
even though a strict reading of the insurance policy would deny such
coverage. 35 Although the Minnesota court has never expressly adopted
N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. 1979). The Prahm court, recognizing the conflict of interest for
the insurer in providing a defense under circumstances when it contests the validity of the
coverage, held that the duty to defend after the insurer unsuccessfully contests coverage
becomes a duty to reimburse the insured for reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defending the suit. See 277 N.W.2d at 391.
34. Truchinski v. Cashman, 257 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. 1977); Red & White Airway Cab
Co. v. Transit Cas. Co., 305 Minn. 353, 234 N.W.2d 580 (1975); Republic Vanguard Ins.
Co. v. Buehl, 295 Minn. 327, 204 N.W.2d 426 (1973); Bobich v. Oja, 258 Minn. 287, 104
N.W.2d 19 (1960); see Christian v. Royal Ins. Co., 185 Minn. 180, 240 N.W. 365 (1932).
35. A general statement of the doctrine is that "[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of [insurance] applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance
contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would
have negated those expectations." Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variancewith Polioy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970), reprinted in R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 351;
accord, Gardner, Reasonable Expectations.- Evolution Completed or Revolution Begun?, 1978 INS.
L.J. 573, 576.
The doctrine of reasonable expectations has generally supplanted the "plain meaning" rule as the pervasive theory in insurance contract interpretation. The doctrine of
reasonable expectations is broader than the long established rule that ambiguities in insurance contracts are to be construed against the drafter of the policy, see note 19 supra,
because even though an insured's objectively reasonable expectations of his policy rights
or coverage may be unambiguously limited or excluded by the policy, they will be
honored. In an excellent comment on an insurer's duty to defend, the following hypothetical is given to demonstrate the practical utility of the reasonable expectations doctrine:
As to the insured's expectations, it is safe to assume that if the ordinary
insurance consumer had thought about them, his expectations would be that the
insurer would defend him whenever there was a threat of liability to him and the
threat was based on facts within the policy. The insured probably would be surprised at the suggestion that defense coverage might turn on the pleading rules
of the court that a third party chose or on how the third party's attorney decided
to write the complaint. In some cases the insured might think in terms of his
own conduct. The bar owner, for example, might well think that he is insulated
from any legal expense arising from injuries to patrons so long as he personally
does not intentionally injure someone or tell an employee to do so. To him the
possibility of an ambitious claimant who would begin a lawsuit with a charge of
intentional injury for the sake of a favorable bargaining position and later be
willing to abandon that charge for one of simple negligence might not occur; or
if the possibility did occur the insured might not pause to consider whether it
would be fatal to part of his insurance coverage. In short, the limits of the phrase
"suits alleging such injury," prepared by lawyers, defended by lawyers and authoritatively interpreted by lawyers, are probably not appreciated by the lay
insured. And even the more sophisticated insured has no choice in the matter,
since the provision is standard.
Comment, supra note 1, at 748 (footnote omitted).
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the doctrine, ever since the decision of Christian v. Royal nsurance Co.,36 the
court generally has looked to the equitiL,: of the particular situation and
has endeavored to honor the reasonable expectations of both insureds
and insurers.37 Only when faced with unusual fact situations has the
For an examination of the reasonable expectations doctrine, see Gray v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966); Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,
58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962); Gardner, supra, at 573; Kamarck,
Opening the Gate. The Steven Case and the Doctrine ofReasonable Expectations, 29 HASTINGS L.J.
153 (1977); Knepper, Insurer's Duty to Defend- Recent Developments, 17 DEF. L.J. 391, 393-97
(1968); Perlet, The Insurance Contract and the Doctrne of Reasonable Expectation, 6 FORUM 116
(1971); Squires, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrne of Reasonable Expectation, 6 FORUM 252
(1971); Tobriner & Grodin, The Individualand the Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial
State, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1247, 1273-76 (1967); Note, The Insurer's Duy to Defend Made Absolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1328 (1967); Note, The Duy of an Insurer to
DefendIts Insured,5 WILLAMETrE L.J. 321 (1969). The Lanoue court implied consideration
of the doctrine by stating that if it denied that the insurers were initially obligated to
defend, "insureds who buy insurance for the defense provided, not just for the indemnity
features, would be losing part of the coverage they reasonably expected to have." 278
N.W.2d at 54; cf Weum v. Mutual Berfit Health & Accident Ass'n, 237 Minn. 89, 105,
54 N.W.2d 20, 29 (1952) (in resolving ambiguities, the court avoids the interpretation that
would forfeit rights the insured may have believed he was securing).
36. 185 Minn. 180, 240 N.W. 365 (1932).
37. Seegeneral4' Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. 1979) (insurer
has duty to defend when the claim is not clearly outside the policy coverage); Lanoue v.
Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 1979) (insurers required to defend
when it cannot be shown that policy exclusions are applicable to all aspects of insured's
claim); Truchinski v. Cashman, 257 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. 1977) (insurer has duty to defend
when the allegations of the complaint against insured state a cause of action within policy
coverage); Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 309 Minn.
14, 242 N.W.2d 840 (1976) (insurer had no duty to defend insured bank when bank,
through its officers, committed fraudulent acts that led to suit); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v.
Bartlett, 307 Minn. 72, 240 N.W.2d 310 (1976) (masonry contractor's knowing violation of
contract specifications would not reasonably be expected to be within general liability
insurance policy coverage), overruled in part on other grounds, Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277
N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. 1979); Red & White Airway Cab Co. v. Transit Cas. Co., 305
Minn. 353, 234 N.W.2d 580 (1975) (words of coverage for damages "caused by accident"
in insurance policy not intended, to include false arrests); Republic Vanguard Ins. Co. v.
Buehl, 295 Minn. 327, 204 N.W.2d 426 (1973) (homeowners insurance policy held to include duty to defend parents against suit for negligent failure to supervise son riding motorcycle); F.D. Chapman Constr. Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 297 Minn. 406, 211 N.W.2d
871 (1973) ("occurrence," within terms of insurance policy, held to include establishment
of a nuisance), overruled in part on other grounds, Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d
389, 391 (Minn. 1979); Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 276
Minn. 362, 150 N.W.2d 233 (1967) ("excess carrier" not entitled to reimbursement for
expenses incurred in defending suit prior to time "primary carrier" took defense); Lang v.
General Ins. Co. of America, 268 Minn. 36, 127 N.W.2d 541 (1964) (motor scooter held to
be within motor vehicle exclusion in homeowners policy); Crum v. Anchor Cas. Co., 264
Minn. 378, 119 N.W.2d 703 (1963) (insurer obligated to take defense when facts outside
the complaint present potential liability on the part of the insured); Bobich v. Oja, 258
Minn. 287, 104 N.W.2d 19 (1960) (insurer not obligated to defend action based on use and
ownership of automobile owned by corporate officer when policy only covered use of
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court found it necessary to deviate from the general rule in order to preserve the coverage reasonably expected by the insured.3 8 This approach
indicates a willingness by the court to look beyond policy provisions to
effect fair constructions of insurance contracts.
Chief Justice Sheran, joined by Justice Peterson, dissented from the
majority opinion in Lanoue.39 While the majority was willing to honor
plaintiff's reasonable :expectation of coverage, the dissent rigidly construed the coverage and exclusions of plaintiff's policies.40 The dissenting
automobiles owned by the corporation); Weis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 242
Minn. 141, 64 N.W.2d 366 (1954) (insurer not obligated to defend when injuries were
caused by insured's own intentional acts and not by "accident" as stated in policy); Christian v. Royal Ins. Co., 185 Minn. 180, 240 N.W. 365 (1932) (servant of insured killed by
tractor being utilized to haul insured truck within coverage of policy insuring maintenance, ownership, and use of truck). Federal court decisions construing the insurer's duty
to defend have generally paralleled the sentiment of the Minnesota court. See generally
Hagen Supply Corp. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 331 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1964) (injuries to
third person from discharge of tear gas device sold to minor through the mail by insured
held not within insured's "Premises-Operations" liability coverage); Globe Indem. Co. v.
Hansen, 231 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1956) (insurer not obligated to assume defense when insured is sued because of acts outside the policy coverage); Kipka v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,
289 F. Supp. 750 (D. Minn. 1968) (insurer required to defend when third party complaint
presents possible meritorious claim within coverage based on implied contractual indemnification obligation); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Swanson, 246 F. Supp. 698 (D.
Minn. 1965) (insurer seeking not to defend has burden of proving insured received notice
of cancellation of policy); Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assurance
Corp., 114 F. Supp. 472 (D. Minn. 1953) (coverage Upheld when hazard arose at the
insured premises even though accident occurred away from the premises).
38. In the vast majority of cases, the general rule will undoubtedly protect the insured's objectively reasonable expectations of coverage. It is only the infrequent cases such
as Lanoue, Crum, and Weir, in which known facts outside the injured party's complaint so
utterly contradict the alleged cause of action and the insured's reasonable expectations,
that courts are compelled to abandon the general rule.
In Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Bartlett, 307 Minn. 72, 240 N.W.2d 310 (1976), overruled
'n
part on other grounds, Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. 1979), the
Minnesota court recently summarized its position on an insurer's duty to defend when it
stated that although the obligation to defend is contractual and is generally determined
by the allegations of the complaint, the allegations do not control when facts outside the
complaint establish the existence or nonexistence of an obligation to defend. 307 Minn. at
75, 240 N.W.2d at 312; accord,Crum v. Anchor Cas. Co., 264 Minn. 378, 392, 119 N.W.2d
703, 712 (1963).
39. 278 N.W.2d at 55-56 (Sheran, C.J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 56 (Sheran, C.J., dissenting). The dissent could see no rationale for the
majority's extension of the Crum holding from " 'defense required when facts known establish a cause of action covered by the policy' to 'defense required when facts known indicate
the exclusion doesn't apply.' " Id. (emphasis in original, footnote omitted). The dissent
construed Cruam to mean that if the facts outside an excluded cause of action establish a
cause of action within coverage, the insurer is obligated to defend. Id. The point of departure between the majority and the dissent was whether or not the facts surrounding
Jeffrey Anderson's accident were within policy coverage. The majority, acknowledging
plaintiff's reasonable expectations and construing ambiguities against the insurers, see
Crum v. Anchor Cas. Co., 264 Minn. 378, 390, 119 N.W.2d 703, 711 (1963), had no
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justices stated that they could not "disregard the language of insurance
policies and. . . impose burdens on insurance companies for which they
have in no way bargained."4' The dissent's respect for the "bargained"
insurance contract is unusual. It is now widely recognized that insurance
contracts are contracts of adhesion.4 2 Insurers' use of standardized form
policies and the disparate bargaining strengths of insurers and insureds
leave little room for bargained contracts. 43 By looking strictly to the injured party's complaint and by narrowly construing the coverage of the
policies, the dissent would have denied plaintiff the right to be defended
against a suit at least potentially within policy coverage. 44 The Lanoue
majority chose to disregard the rule that the allegations exclusively determine the insurer's duty to defend, In finding that the insurers had a duty
to defend, the majority acknowledged the principle that insureds
purchase and expect protection from damages and lawsuits arising from
occurrences arguably covered by their policies, not merely from allegations in complaints.
The court in Lanoue also decided that neither insurer had met its burden of proving that the claim fell outside its policy based on the exclutrouble finding coverage. 278 N.W.2d at 54. The dissent, on the other hand, was not
nearly as sympathetic, stating that the facts "indicated neither a covered cause of action
nor the likelihood of a covered suit." Id. at 56.
41. 278 N.W.2d at 55 (Sheran, C.J., dissenting). The dissent elaborated, explaining
that
[n]ot only was the suit brought within exclusions to the two policies, but the
actual facts known to the insurance companies established no cause of action
within the coverage of either policy....
To hold insurance companies responsible for the defense of an excluded suit
under such circumstances is to ignore their right as businesses to provide only
that product specified by the bargaining process.
42. In a case construing a liability insurance policy, the California Supreme Court
described a contract of adhesion as "a contract entered into between two parties of unequal bargaining strength, expressed in the language of a standardized contract, written by
the more powerful bargainer to meet its own needs, and offered to the weaker party on a
'take it or leave it basis.' " Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269, 419 P.2d 168, 171,
54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1966).
The element of a negotiated or bartered exchange between traders is wholly absent in
the creation of modern insurance contracts. See Keeton, supra note 35, at 966. The absence of a voluntary exchange and the inability of the weaker "bargainer" to improve his
position is the essence of an adhesion contract.
[W]hen bargaining is absent, not only from the transaction but also from the
process which produces the form, [there is still] a contract but, . . . it is a "contract of adhesion." One party "adheres" to the terms prescribed by the other.
The adhering party consents but he lacks bargaining power to affect the terms to
which he consents. The result is a private statute with the adhering party consenting to live under the "law" promulgated in the form.
Meyer, ContractsofAdhesion andtht Doctnne of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L. REV. 1178, 1179
(1964). See generaly Hollman, Insurance as a Contract of Adhesion, 1978 INS. L.J. 274; Note,
Insurance: The Meaning of the Contract in Light of the lnsued's Reasonable Expectations, 2 LINCOLN L. REV. 157 (1967).
43. See note 42 supra.
44. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
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sions therein. 4 5 In placing the burden of proof on the insurer, the court
relied on ED. Chapman Construction Co. v. Glens Falls Insurance Co.,46 which
held that in order to negate the insurer's duty to defend, the pleadings
and facts must clearly establish that the policy claim falls outside the
policy terms. 47 With the burden placed on the insurer, the Lanoue court
departed from the general rule that the burden of proof in a declaratory
judgment action rests upon the complaining party 48 as well as the rule
that the party claiming coverage under an insurance policy has the burden of proof.49 In many instances, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
placed the burden of proof on the insurer.50 Prior to Lanoue, in a declaratory judgment action brought by an insurer, the court had stated that an
insurer seeking to avoid having to defend carries the burden of demonstrating that the cause of action against the insured falls outside the scope
of coverage. 51 It is apparent from the holding in Lanoue that the rule
45. 278 N.W.2d at 53-54.
46. 297 Minn. 406, 211 N.W.2d 871 (1973), overuld i part on other grounds, Prahm v.
Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. 1979), accord, Bituminous Cas. Corp. v.
Bartlett, 307 Minn. 72, 75-76, 240 N.W.2d 310, 312 (1976), overruled in part on othergrounds,
Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. 1979); f Boedigheimer v. Taylor, 287 Minn. 323, 329, 178 N.W.2d 610, 614 (1970) (burden of proof shifts to insurer to
prove exclusions apply after insured has established a prima facie case for coverage).
47. 297 Minn. at 408, 211 N.W.2d,at 872.
48. See, e.g., Canadian Indem. Co. v. Ohio Farmers' Indem. Co., 251 F.2d 563, 570
(9th Cir. 1958); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Leslie, 55 F. Supp. 134, 136 (E.D. I11.1944);
Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Francher, 30 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Mo. 1939); White v. Brookley
Fed. Credit Union, 283 Ala. 597, 602-03, 219 So. 2d 849, 853 (1968) (per curiam).
49. See Boedigheimer v. Taylor, 287 Minn. 323, 329, 178 N.W.2d 610, 614 (1970)
(burden of proof rests with party claiming coverage; once prima facie case for coverage is
established, burden shifts to insurer to prove that any exclusions apply); accord, Cash v.
Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 111 Minn. 162, 167, 126 N.W. 524, 525 (1910) (burden of proving
insurable interest on insured, but issuance of policy is prima facie evidence thereof). See
also National Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Fischer, 386 F.2d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 1967)
(insurer asserting affirmative defense that insureds had falsely concealed nature of use of
aircraft covered by policy had burden of proof).
50. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Schwartz, 304 Minn. 155, 229 N.W.2d 511 (1975) (as to
cause of damage to an automobile); Cavallero v. Travelers Ins. Co., 197 Minn. 417, 267
N.W. 370 (1936) (as to exclusion for wounds not visible); Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v.
National Life Ins. Co., 195 Minn. 31, 261 N.W. 580 (1935) (as to fraudulent representations by insured in application for insurance); Topinka v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
189 Minn. 75, 248 N.W. 660 (1933) (nonpayment of insurance premiums); Thompson v.
Bankers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 128 Minn. 474, 151 N.W. 180 (1915) (intoxication of insured
at time of accident); Taylor v. Security Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 88 Minn. 231, 92 N.W. 952
(1903) (breach of condition against increased risks); Mistilski v. German Ins. Co., 64
Minn. 366, 67 N.W. 80 (1896) (breach of condition against incumbrances).
51. See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Bartlett, 307 Minn. 72, 76, 240 N.W.2d 310, 312
(1976), overruled in part on other grounds, Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 391
(Minn. 1979). See also Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Swanson, 246 F. Supp. 698, 700
(D. Minn. 1965) (insurer bringing declaratory judgment action to determine duty to defend carries burden of proving that insured received notice of policy cancellation).
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placing the burden of proof on the insurer will be applied regardless of
which party initiates the declaratory judgment action. This holding is in
accord with the accepted principle of resolving doubts concerning policy
52
coverage in favor of the insured.
In addition to its holding regarding the duty to defend, the Lanoue
court also examined the extent of an insurer's liability for wrongfully53
declining defense. At the declaratory judgment trial, plaintiff sought to
recover not only the judgment and costs incurred in defending the third
party action but also the costs and attorney's fees he incurred during the
declaratory judgment trial.54 The court held that the insurers were liable for plaintiff's costs and attorney's fees incurred in the declaratory
judgment action. 55 The court reasoned that the insurers' refusal of the
tendered defense was a breach of the contractual duty to defend and that
the costs of the declaratory judgment action as well as the costs of defending the third-party action were consequential damages of that
56
breach.
Construing an insurer's wrongful refusal to defend as a breach of contract and awarding defense costs to the insured as consequential damages
of the breach is the customary practice in cases similar to Lanoue.57 The
award of declaratory judgment costs, on the other hand, has not received
52. See, e.g., Lees v. Smith, 363 So. 2d 974, 979 (La. App. 1978) (insurer is obligated
to provide defense unless plaintiffs petition unambiguously excludes coverage); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Bartlett, 307 Minn. 72, 76, 240 N.W.2d 310, 312 (1976) (insurer seeking
to avoid duty to defend has burden of demonstrating that all aspects of cause of action
against insured are outside scope of policy coverage), overruledin part on other grounds, Prahm
v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. 1979); Crum v. Anchor Cas. Co., 264
Minn. 378, 390, 119 N.W.2d 703, 711 (1963) (all doubts as to insurer's duty to defend
should be resolved in favor of insured).
53. The words "erroneous," see Rent-A-Scooter, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins.
Co., 285 Minn. 264, 268, 173 N.W.2d 9, 11 (1969), "unjustified," see 7C J. APPLEMAN,
supra note 3, § 4690, and "unwarranted," see id. § 4691, have all been used to describe an
insurer's refusal to defend a suit that it honestly believes is excluded from coverage but
which later proves to be within coverage.
54. 278 N.W.2d at 51-52. There was a question as to whether the plaintiff had raised
the issue of recovering his trial costs at the declaratory judgment trial. The court found
that evidence on the issue was received at trial without objection and that plaintiff's counsel alluded to the issue in his final arguments and trial memorandum. Id. at 54. The court
said that it was "apparent that plaintiffs intended to raise the issue and the failure of the
defendants to respond to it will not preclude our considering it." Id.
55. Id. at 55.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Hogan v. Midland Nat'l Ins. Co., 3 Cal. 3d 553, 476 P.2d 825, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 153 (1970) (insured entitled to recover all attorney's fees incurred when insurer refused to defend despite fact that not all damages recovered by third party were within
policy coverage); Loeber Motors, Inc. v. Sims, 34 11. App. 3d 342, 340 N.E.2d 132 (1975)
(insurer liable for insured's attorney's fees when insurer wrongfully refused to defend covered claim); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 64 Mich. App.
315, 235 N.W.2d 769 (1975) (same); Abbey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 281 Minn. 113, 160
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widespread recognition.58 The general rule is that attorney's fees are allowed only when authorized by statute or when provided for in the insurance contract. 59 The Minnesota Supreme Court has previously refused
to award attorney's fees even when the insured was successful in the declaratory judgment action.60 Other courts have refused to award attorney's fees incurred in declaratory judgment actions absent a showing of
bad faith, fraud, or stubborn litigiousness on the part of the insurer.61
In deciding to award plaintiff his attorney's fees incurred in the declaratory judgment action, the court carefully pointed out that its decision
N.W.2d 709 (1968) (same); Fruchtman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 Minn. 54,
142 N.W.2d 299 (1966) (same); Christian v. Royal Ins. Co., 185 Minn. 180, 240 N.W. 365
(1932) (same); Mannheimer Bros. v. Kansas Cas. & Sur. Co., 149 Minn. 482, 184 N.W.
189 (1921) (same); Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 295 N.E.2d 849,
334 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972) (same).
58. Courts have generally denied insureds recovery of their declaratory judgment litigation costs if there has not been a showing of bad faith on the part of the insurer. See,
e.g., Lowell v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 298, 419 P.2d 180, 54 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1966)
(insured not entitled to recover attorney's fees in his own action against insurer for breach
of duty to defend); Beck v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 279 So. 2d 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1973) (insured did not recover expenses of second suit when insured filed two separate suits against insurer for reimbursement instead of filing one suit after both third party
actions had been decided); Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Murray, 97 Ill. App. 2d 61, 239
N.E.2d 498 (1968) (insured denied recovery of attorney's fees for defending insurer's declaratory judgment action); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Christy, 200 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa
1972) (insurer not liable for insured's expense of defending declaratory judgment proceeding in absence of fraud or bad faith on part of insurer); New Jersey Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co.
v. United States Gas. Co., 91 N.J. Super. 404, 220 A.2d 708 (App. Div. 1966) (same);
Johnson v. General Mut. Ins. Co., 24 N.Y.2d 42, 246 N.E.2d 713, 298 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1969)
(insured entitled to damages for expenses in defending insurer's declaratory judgment action but not for expenses of prosecuting his cross claims against insurer).
59. 278 N.W.2d at 54; Busse v. Board of County Comm'rs, 308 Minn. 184, 190, 241
N.W.2d 794, 798 (1976); State v. Carter, 300 Minn. 495, 497, 221 N.W.2d 106, 107 (1974);
Abbey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 281 Minn. 113, 115, 160 N.W.2d 709, 710 (1968); 16 G.
COUCH, supra note 3, §§ 58:113-:114 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1966 & Supp. 1979). But see
MINN. STAT. § 555.10 (1978) (Minnesota Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act) ("[Tihe
court may make such award of costs as may seem equitable and just.").
60. See Nelson v. American Reliable Ins. Co., 286 Minn. 21, 29, 174 N.W.2d 126, 131
(1970); Rent-A-Scooter, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 285 Minn. 264, 268-69,
173 N.W.2d 9, 11-12 (1969); Abbey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 281 Minn. 113, 160 N.W.2d 709
(1968).
61. See, e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Riley, 380 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1967) (insured not
entitled to attorney's fees for defense of declaratory action brought by insurer in medical
malpractice suit in absence of showing of bad faith in filing suit or that insurer was stubbornly litigious); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Christy, 200 N.W.2d 834, 843-44 (Iowa 1972)
(explaining Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sammons, 63 Ga. App. 323, 326-27, 11 S.E.2d 89, 91-92
(1940) as refusing attorney's fees to insureds unless they show the insurer brought the
declaratory judgment action in bad faith or was stubbornly litigious); cf. Nationwide Ins.
Co. v. Harvey, 50 Ohio App. 2d 361, 363 N.E.2d 596 (1976) (insurer held accountable for
insured's attorney's fees after insurer accepted defense and brought declaratory judgment
action that appeared to the court to be intended to burden the insured by forcing defense
of a needless action).
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was within the limited exception to the general rule established in Morrison . Swenson. 62

In Morrison the court had held that an insurer that

wrongfully refused to defend its insured will be held liable for "whatever
expenses [the insured] has been compelled to incur in asserting his rights,
as a direct loss incident to the breach of contract."6 3 Although the Minnesota court had previously stated that more than an arguable difference
of opinion between an insurer and its insured as to policy coverage would
62. 274 Minn. 127, 142 N.W.2d 640 (1966). In Morson defendant insurance company refused to defend its insured against a suit arising from an automobile accident. The
insured thought he was covered by the insurer's automobile liability policy when in fact
the insurance agent, from whom the insured had purchased his policy, had failed properly
to renew the policy. The agent was not employed by the insurer but sold insurance independently. The insurer refused defense of the third party injury suit on the theory that the
policy covering the insured's car had lapsed and that the independent agent was the insured's broker, not its own agent. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this theory and
determined that the agent was, from the standpoint of the insured, an agent of the insurer
and that the insurer had allowed the agent to assume this appearance. Id. at 137, 142
N.W.2d at 646-47. The court therefore held that the insurer was responsible for the
agent's actions and that it had wrongfully refused to defend. The court concluded its
opinion by stating that the insurer was liable for the insured's declaratory judgment costs,
even though there had been no showing of bad faith or unreasonable conduct on the part
of the insurer. Id. at 138, 142 N.W.2d at 647.
63. Id. at 138, 142 N.W.2d at 647. Subsequent decisions have limited the breach of
contract analysis to situations in which the insured had defended, or had been named to
defend, a third party action prior to seeking declaratory judgment. See Prahm v. Rupp
Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. 1979) (insured awarded declaratory judgment
costs upon establishing insurer's duty to defend even though insured had not yet gone to
trial against third party); Nelson v. American Reliable Ins. Co., 286 Minn. 21, 24, 174
N.W.2d 126, 131 (1970) (declaratory judgment costs not awarded because there was no
third party action); Rent-A-Scooter, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 285 Minn.
264, 269, 173 N.W.2d 9, 11-12 .(1969) (declaratory judgment costs not awarded because
insured defaulted in third party action, thus incurring no defense costs); Olsen v. Preferred
Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 284 Minn. 498, 507-08, 170 N.W.2d 581, 587 (1969) (declaratory judgment costs not awarded where there are no third party litigation costs incurred); Abbey v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 281 Minn. 113, 119, 160 N.W.2d 709, 712 (1968) (declaratory judgment costs not awarded when insured is seeking merely to recover benefits and has incurred no third party litigation costs). But see Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Luthi, 303 Minn.
161, 171, 226 N.W.2d 878, 885 (1975) (insured who successfully established coverage was
awarded declaratory judgment costs even though there was no third party action nor denial of defense by insurer).
In Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Polar Panel Co., 457 F.2d 957 (8th Cir. 1972), the
Eighth Circuit, applying Minnesota law, construed the denial of costs in Rent-A-Scooter,
Inc. as overruling the Morrison rule. Id. at 961-62. Because the Rent-A-Scooter, Inc. court
had denied declaratory judgment costs to an insured though it had successfully established
the insurer's liability for a default judgment entered against it in a third party action, the
federal court understood Morrison to be overruled and refused costs in a declaratory judgment action by an insured against its insurer who had refused to defend. The Lanoue court
distinguished Morrison from Rent-A-Scooter, Inc. on the basis of relief requested. The Lanoue
court noted that the insured in Rent-A-Scooter, Inc., who had defaulted and therefore incurred no defense costs in the third party action, was seeking indemnity, not defense litigation costs, from its insurer and therefore the Mornson rule did not apply and no costs were
to be awarded. 278 N.W.2d at 55 n.2.
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be required to impose extra-contractual liability for legal fees on the insurer,64 the Lanoue court distinguished declaratory judgment actions that
determine only policy coverage from declaratory actions that determine
65
the insurer's duty to defend or pay defense costs incurred by its insured.
The court said that when the duty to pay a claim is at issue, the general
rule applies and declaratory judgment costs are awarded only if provided
for by statute or by the insurance contract. 66 However, when the duty to
defend is at issue and the insured succeeds in proving that the insurer has
wrongfully refused the defense, recovery of declaratory judgment costs
and attorney's fees is allowed. 6 7 Thus, regardless of who initiates the declaratory judgment action, whenever the insured establishes that the insurer is obligated to defend, the insured can recover the costs and
6
attorney's fees incurred in the declaratory judgment action. 8
The Lanoue court recognized the distinction between an insurer's duty
to defend and its duty to pay claims covered by the policy. 69 The court
observed that "[tihe duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify." 70 The rationale that the court has repeatedly relied upon is that if
courts do not hold insurers liable for the cost of a declaratory judgment
action decided in the insured's favor, when there are ambiguities as to
the obligation to defend, the insurer may be less inclined to accept tender
of the defense or commence a declaratory judgment action to determine
what its duty is under the circumstances.71 The court evidently fears
that without adhering to its Mor'son holding, insurers will idly refuse to
defend all suits.
64. Abbey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 281 Minn. 113, 116-17, 160 N.W.2d 709, 711 (1968)
(quoting Sukup v. State, 19 N.Y.2d 519, 522, 227 N.E.2d 842, 844, 281 N.Y.S.2d 28, 31
(1967)).
65. 278 N.W.2d at 54-55. In both cases, the declaratory judgment action determines
the insurer's liability or probable liability under its policy; that is, the apparent coverage
of the policy. Since insurance contracts obligate the insurer to defend all actions against
the insured alleging facts covered by the policy, even though the allegations may be
groundless, false, or fraudulent, see note 25 supra and accompanying text, the declaratory
judgment action could well determine that an insurer has an obligation to defend a suit
against its insured that proves to be excluded from coverage. Likewise, when an alleged
cause of action is excluded from coverage and the facts of the action are not clearly within
or without coverage, the trial court could declare that the insurer is required to defend its
insured against a suit excluded from coverage. As the court stated in a footnote to the
Lanoue decision: "The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify." 278 N.W.2d
at 53 n.l.

66. 278 N.W.2d at 54.
67. Id. at 55.
68. "[W]here an insurance contract is intended to relieve the insured of the financial
burden of litigation, the insured will not be required to pay the litigation costs of forcing
the insurer to assume that burden." Id. at 55.
69. See id. at 55.
70. 278 N.W.2d at 53 n.1.
71. The following excerpt from Mr. Appleman's treatise has been either quoted or
cited in Lanoue, 278 N.W.2d at 55; Nelson v. American Reliable Ins. Co., 286 Minn. 21, 29,
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The Lanoue decision illustrates the Minnesota Supreme Court's concern for insureds who are unaware of the niceties of the insurance contract. The decision reveals the court's adherence to the principle that the
insured's right to defense should not depend solely on the manner in
which the injured party chooses to frame the complaint. Insurers in
Minnesota must now look beyond an injured party's complaint when the
alleged cause of action is excluded from coverage and facts known to the
insurer contradict the allegations, potentially bringing the action within
coverage. By recognizing an insurer's reasonable expectations of coverage and by charging insurers with the burden of disproving their duty to
defend, no matter who initiates the declaratory judgment action, the
court has compelled insurers to consider carefully their duty to defend.
While Lanoue favors the insured, the decision raises important questions regarding the procedure to be used when the insurer chooses to
contest coverage. Most litigation over insurance coverage occurs in a declaratory judgment action detet'mined prior to the merits of the main
action against the insured. Findings that are part of the declaratory
judgment, whether granting or denying the duty to defend or indemnify,
may create a procedural impediment at the subsequent trial. While the
former rule that coverage was determined on the basis of the allegations
in the complaint made this possibility remote, 72 Lanoue's requirement
that facts outside the complaint be considered in determining coverage
opens the door to factual determinations that may later constitute collateral estoppel. Thus, under Lanoue, the declaratory judgment action determining coverage may become as important as trial of the main action
on the merits. Viewed in this light, Lanoue could seriously complicate the
declaratory judgment procedure. Attorneys may now be required to use
174 N.W.2d 126, 131 (1970); Rent-A-Scooter, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 285
Minn. 264, 268, 173 N.W.2d 9, 11 (1969); see Morrison v. Swenson, 274 Minn. 127, 138,
142 N.W.2d 640, 647 (1966):
Where an insurer failed to defend until after an adverse decision in a declaratory
judgment action instituted by it, such insurer was held not liable to pay the
attorneys' fees and expenses incurred by the insured in the declaratory judgment
action, in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or stubborn litigiousness on the part of
the insurer. But, despite the qualifications placed upon this rule by the court, it
still appears to be unfair to the insured. After all, the insurer had contracted to
defend the insured, and it failed to do so. It guessed wrong as to its duty, and
should be compelled to bear the consequences thereof. If the rule laid down by
these courts should be followed by other authorities, it would actually amount
to permitting the insurer to do by indirection that which it could not do directly.
That is, the insured has a contract right to have actions against him defended by
the insurer, at its expense. If the insurer can force him into a delaratory judgment proceeding and, even though it loses such action, compel him to bear the
expense of such litigation, the insured is actually do better off financially than if
he had never had the contract right mentioned above.
7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 4691 (footnote omitted).
72. See Truchinski v. Cashman, 257 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. 1977) (trial court judge may
not give collateral estoppel effect to finding in declaratory judgment action erroneously
based on facts beyond allegations in complaint).
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extreme care in the presentation of factual issues in declaratory judgment
proceedings in which coverage cannot be determined solely upon the
allegations of the complaint.
Kossak v. Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30
(Minn. 1979).
The Minnesota Municipal Tort Liability Act' imposes significant restrictions on the ability of victims of municipal2 negligence to seek redress for injuries. The most important of these restrictions are the
requirements that the plaintiff serve timely notice of a possible tort claim
upon the municipality, and that the action be commenced, in most cases,
within one year of the notice.3 In an effort partially to alleviate the inequities inherent in these requirements, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
recently abandoned the rule of strict compliance with the notice of claim
Torts-MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY

1. MINN. STAT. §§ 466.01-.15 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
2. MINN. STAT. § 466.01(1) (1978) defines "municipality" as "any city, whether
organized under home rule charter or otherwise, any county, town, public authority, public corporation, special district, school district, however organized, county agricultural society organized pursuant to chapter 38, or other political subdivision." Id.
3. See Act of May 22, 1963, ch. 798, § 5, 1963 Minn. Laws 1396, 1398, which was in
effect on the date of the accident in Kossak. It provided:
Every person who claims damages from any municipality for or on account of
any loss or injury within the scope of Section 2 shall cause to be presented to the
governing body of the municipality within 30 days after the alleged loss or injury
a written notice stating the time, place and circumstances thereof, and the
amount of compensation or other relief demanded. Failure to state the amount
of compensation or other relief demanded does not invalidate the notice; but in
such case, the claimant shall furnish full information regarding the nature and
extent of the injuries and damages within 15 days after demand by the municipality. No action therefor shall be maintained unless such notice has been given
and unless the action is commenced within one year after such notice. The time
for giving such notice does not include the time, not exceeding 90 days, during
which the person injured is incapacitated by the injury from giving the notice.
Id. MINN. STAT. § 466.05(1) (1978) presently provides:
Except as provided in subdivisions 2 and 3, every person who claims damages
from any municipality for or on account of any loss or injury within the scope of
section 466.02 shall cause to be presented to the governing body of the municipality within 180 days after the alleged loss or injury is discovered a notice stating the time, place and circumstances thereof, and the amount of compensation
or other relief demanded. Actual notice of sufficient facts to reasonably put the
governing body of the municipality or its insurer on notice of a possible claim
shall be construed to comply with the notice requirements of this section. Failure to state the amount of compensation or other relief demanded does not invalidate the notice; but in such case, the claimant shall furnish full information
regarding the nature and extent of the injuries and damages within 15 days after
demand by the municipality. No action therefore shall be maintained unless
such notice has been given and unless the action is commenced within one year
after such notice. The time for giving such notice does not include the time, not
exceeding 90 days, during which the person injured is incapacitated by the injury from giving the notice.
Id. No notice is required for injuries from intentional torts or the use of motor vehicles
owned by a municipality or operated by its employees. Id. § 466.05.
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